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Introduction
Countries often have contradictory attitudes regarding foreign direct investment.
Xenophobia and a concern of foreign ownership of domestic assets induce countries to discourage FDI. In some cases domestic competitors also prefer to keep the foreign rivals away from low-wage domestic labor. In other cases, domestic firms welcome FDI to 'level the playing field' so that foreign rivals face similar production costs. For the latter case, the case of the U.S. auto market and Japanese manufacturers comes to mind. Originally, the Japanese auto manufacturers exported all of their cars to the United States, taking advantage of lower labor costs in Japan. But this began to change in the early 1980's when they faced export restrictions.
To avoid trade barriers present and potential and also to take advantage of tax breaks from state governments seeking to expand employment, Japanese auto makers began to set up plants within the United States, even though relocation raised marginal costs for them.
1 Thus, in general FDI harmonizes costs between domestic and foreign firms but as a result average industry cost may be higher or lower relative to exporting. The objective of this paper is to examine the effects on domestic country welfare from these marginal cost changes associated with FDI.
While the strategic effects of FDI have been extensively studied in the literature, surprisingly there has been little analysis of the welfare implications of these cost changes, perhaps because the answer seems obvious. On one hand, when FDI lowers marginal costs for foreign firms, domestic competitors are clearly harmed while consumers benefit. If FDI instead increases marginal costs for foreign firms, then the effects reverse. This tradeoff between consumer and to domestic firm welfare seems straightforward at first. If the harm to domestic 1 A firm may also choose marginal cost increasing FDI if its fixed costs of operation decrease sufficiently. The decrease in fixed cost could come from avoiding fixed-cost non-tariff barriers.
firms from cost reducing FDI outweighs the benefit to consumers, then FDI deteriorates domestic country welfare. Then by the logical extension it would seem that cost-raising FDI in the same circumstance must improve domestic country welfare. However, welfare can decrease from FDI, regardless of whether FDI raises or lowers the foreign firms' cost.
To develop the reason intuitively, consider the Cournot duopoly with one foreign firm and one domestic firm competing in the domestic market. As noted above, FDI produces opposing effects on domestic consumer and producer welfare, but in this case the gain to one side is always less in magnitude than the loss to the other. To see why, note that, whether foreign costs are greater or less than domestic costs, FDI brings foreign costs closer in line to domestic costs. Since demand slopes downward, domestic consumer surplus is convex and decreasing in marginal costs. Thus, the gain to domestic consumers when a foreign firm's costs decrease to domestic costs (and so domestic price decreases) is less than the loss to consumer welfare when a foreign firm's costs increase to domestic costs. For an analogous reason the loss to domestic producer surplus from when foreign costs decrease is greater than the gain when foreign costs increase. Thus, FDI reduces welfare in a Cournot duopoly regardless of whether it is cost increasing or cost decreasing.
This result extends to the multi-firm model: if there are nearly as many foreign firms as domestic firms in industry, FDI always reduce domestic welfare, whether FDI reduces or increases marginal costs for foreign firms. Furthermore, when FDI involves large changes in costs, then if the proportion of domestic firm ownership is at least 30 percent, FDI reduces welfare, whether it is cost-raising or cost-reducing. In the case of cost-raising FDI, FDI can reduce welfare regardless of the proportion of domestic ownership, if the initial cost difference is substantial.
Our work is related to the work of Salant and Shaffer (1999) and Lahiri and Ono (1988) , both of which examine the welfare effect of changes in Cournot firms' marginal costs in the absence of foreign competition. Salant and Shaffer (1999) show that introducing a cost asymmetry in a Cournot oligopoly, while holding industry output constant, improves welfare. It is well know that, in a Cournot oligopoly with constant marginal costs, industry output and price are independent of distribution of individual firm marginal costs when average marginal cost are held constant (see Bergstrom and Varian 1985) . Thus, a mean-preserving spread in marginal costs has no effect on price and hence consumer surplus, but reduces average cost of production as lower cost firms produce more while higher cost firms contract. Hence welfare improves.
Since here FDI reduces the cost asymmetry among firms when half or more of the firms are domestic, our result -that FDI decreases welfare -may appear to be equivalent to the SalantShaffer (1999) result. However, there are crucial differences. First, recall that the Salant-Shaffer (1999) result depends on the constancy of industry output, while here FDI also affects industry output (as average marginal costs are not held constant). Further, while in Salant and Shaffer (1999) aggregate profits are (naturally) used for welfare calculus, the welfare measure here excludes foreign profits. Hence the efficiency loss or gain by the foreign firms does not enter into the welfare calculation.
Because of these differences in assumptions, our results are driven by additional effects than those responsible for the Salant-Shaffer (1999) result. To illustrate this point, consider the limiting case of our model, in which the proportion of firms that are domestic approaches one.
Then, the model approaches the Salant-Shaffer model, so one might expect that our results would converge with Salant and Shaffer (1999) ; i.e., the diminishing cost asymmetry would reduce domestic welfare. However, we find that cost increasing FDI always raises domestic welfare.
Second, as noted above, when the number of domestic firms is sufficiently close to that of foreign firms, FDI decreases domestic welfare, no matter what the cost difference is between domestic and foreign producers. Thus, even if FDI results in a significant decrease in industry average cost, the cost harmonization still decreases domestic welfare. In contrast, in Salant and Shaffer (1999) welfare improves because a mean-preserving spread reduces industry average cost. Finally, as we obtain conditions when FDI reduces welfare when a majority of producers are foreign, we find cases when welfare decreases even though FDI both increases the spread of the marginal costs (which is a benefit in Salant and Shaffer 1999) and decreases industry average cost (which increases domestic output).
In related work, Lahiri and Ono (1988) show for an asymmetric Cournot oligopoly that a small cost reduction by an inefficient firm can lower welfare. 2 This has the following intuitive explanation. A cost reduction by any firm decreases price and raises consumer surplus. However, a marginal reduction in the marginal cost of an inefficient firm expands its output, replacing output by lower-cost firms and as a result raises industry average cost. If the latter dominates the beneficial effect on consumer surplus, then welfare falls.
By symmetry the Lahiri-Ono (1988) model implies that a small cost increase by an inefficient firm is welfare improving if a small cost reduction is welfare decreasing. The critical difference is that in our model, when a cost reduction lowers welfare, a cost increase can also reduce welfare in the same setting. The source of this difference results from different questions being asked. To begin, Lahiri and Ono's (1988) welfare measure includes all firms as well as consumer surplus, while we exclude foreign profits. More importantly, Lahiri and Ono's (1988) result requires that the cost-reducing firm be small relative to the market, while our result does 2 See also Farrell and Shapiro (1990) .
not require that the cost reduction to be small, and can hold when the firms are large relative to the market or multiple firms receive the cost reduction. Indeed, Lahiri and Ono (1988) find that if the cost-reducing firm has more than a third of the market then the cost reduction increases welfare. In contrast, we find that the foreign firms can have roughly half the market and its cost reduction will reduce welfare. Further, we find that even if marginal costs rise for foreign firms, domestic welfare can decrease.
Our findings have implications on other work that examines foreign direct investment.
For example, consider recent work on examining the role uncertainty has on FDI under strategic competition; e.g., Sung and Lapan (2000) for exchange rates uncertainty and Qiu and Zhou (2006) for demand uncertainty with learning. Our findings suggest that when the exchange rate uncertainty affects costs, then the welfare effects for the domestic country are not solely driven by uncertainty since FDI also has a cost harmonization effect. Likewise, the results under demand uncertainty may not carry over to the case of cost uncertainty due to the cost harmonization effect of FDI.
The implication of this result holds in other environments as well, including tax harmonization. Consider the same model but with firms facing identical costs of production and their location fixed. Assume the foreign government imposes a tax t f (t < 0, a subsidy) on firms producing in their country while the domestic government imposes a tax t d . If the foreign government harmonizes its tax to the domestic government's tax, then domestic welfare decreases under the same conditions we derive for FDI to be welfare reducing.
In the next section we introduce the basic modeling assumptions. In section three, we present the equilibrium outcomes and in the subsequent section the welfare analysis of a single foreign firm choosing FDI instead of exporting. Section five extends the analysis to multiple (including all) foreign firms choosing FDI. The penultimate section extends the model by considering partial harmonization, that is, if the foreign cost only changes in the direction of the domestic costs. This section also examines the effect of product differentiation, and how the model can be interpreted in terms of tax harmonization. The final section concludes.
Model environment
There are n (≥ 2) firms competing in the domestic market. As we are considering plant location, it is natural to assume Cournot competition. To focus on the strategic implications from cost harmonization effects from FDI, assume the firms are producing identical goods and ignore other costs, e.g., fixed or setup costs.
Production costs for firm i are linear and depend only on the country of production: 
Equilibrium
In this section we solve for the Cournot-Nash equilibrium. As each firm simultaneously sets output, firm i chooses q i to maximize profit 
A foreign firm that chooses to export has equilibrium output
There are d⋅n + x firms producing in the domestic country and (1 -d)⋅n -x firms producing in the foreign country. Aggregate output is, from equations (2) and (3),
From equations (1) - (3) we can derive the representative firm's profit whose production occurs domestically:
This expression is clearly decreasing in x only when FDI is cost-reducing (c d < c f ). Thus, costreducing (cost-raising) FDI harms (benefits) the domestic firms. Aggregate domestic profits are
Given the preferences on our representative consumer, consumer surplus is
It is immediate from the above that cost-reducing (cost-raising) FDI increases (decreases) domestic consumer surplus. Domestic country welfare W(x) is defined as the sum of total profits to domestic firms and consumer surplus. Given the definitions above, we have
Welfare effects of FDI by a single foreign firm
We suppose that x = 0 initially, i.e., the status quo has all foreign firms export from their home countries, and analyze the welfare effect of a single foreign firm switching to FDI (x = 1).
For the case of cost-reducing FDI, the status quo may be the result of a deliberate ban on FDI, or prohibitively high fixed setup costs (e.g., through bureaucratic requirements). 3 Then, relaxing such restrictions could immediately induce all the foreign firms to relocate in the domestic country (thereby gaining a cost reduction). However, it is possible to control the number of firms engaging in FDI by eliminating the fixed costs for, or giving permits to, only a subset of foreign firms. 4 Even in the case of cost-raising FDI, foreign firms may choose FDI over exporting if the (un-modeled) fixed costs of operation are sufficiently lower domestically. 5 In other cases, inducing FDI might require subsidizing setup costs of FDI or alternatively raise the actual or potential future cost of export as in the case of Japanese automakers as noted in the introduction. However, here we abstract from these points to ask whether generally FDI is welfare worsening.
Using (4), the general expression for the welfare change from a single foreign firm choosing FDI (i.e., x = 0 to x = 1) is:
To gain insight to the expression on the right-hand side, we begin by considering three canonical environments.
Case 1: d = 1/2 (the number of foreign firms is exactly half of the total producers, which includes the standard case of one domestic and one foreign firm). Then, equation (5) becomes:
The right-hand side of (6) The case when half the firms are domestic producer includes the standard model in international trade of a duopoly with one firm located in each country. For this special case the result is surprising especially in the context of Salant and Shaffer (1999) . There, a mean-preserving spread in marginal costs reduces average industry cost, and hence improves welfare. Here, the foreign marginal cost can be much higher than the domestic cost so that FDI can reduce average marginal cost significantly (especially in the two firm case) and yet welfare decreases. However, at n = 2 the expression is negative.
Here, the effects are subtler than in the first two cases. Specifically, whether cost-reducing or cost-increasing, FDI can reduce domestic welfare. Consider first cost-reducing FDI (c f > c d ). As can easily be verified from (7), cost-reducing FDI always decreases welfare despite the benefit it confers on consumers. The reason is that an output expansion by the lone foreign firm (whose cost was higher with exporting) induces all domestic firms to contract output but domestic firms are more efficient than the foreign firm. Thus, this result is akin to the result obtained by Lahiri and Ono (1988) that an expansion by an inefficient firm can reduce welfare. The difference is that here the foreign firm can have a higher share of the market than in Lahiri and Ono (1988) ; and the cost reduction for the inefficient firm can be large.
Since cost-reducing FDI reduces welfare when there is only one foreign firm one might be tempted to conclude that cost-raising FDI must increase domestic welfare in this case.
Surprisingly, however, this symmetry in results does not always hold. To see this, note that the numerator on the right-hand side of equation (7) is increasing in c d . At d = (n -1)/n,
is the maximum c d such that there is an interior solution (i.e., all firms produce). At this value of c d , the numerator on the right-hand side of (7) becomes 3(1 -c f )/2 > 0 and, since FDI is cost- almost completely dominated by domestic producers.
The symmetries in results of course can occur. For example, let n > 2 and c f be sufficiently close to c d . Then, as can easily be checked from Equation (7), cost-increasing FDI increases welfare. This case, however, is also somewhat surprising in the context of Salant and Shaffer (1999) . Here, as d approaches unity so that, in the limit there are no foreign firms, the present model approaches the one considered in Salant and Shaffer (1999) . Yet, Salant and Shaffer (1999) have found that cost harmonization always decreases welfare, while here cost harmonizing FDI can increase welfare. The proposition implies that the welfare effect of FDI is sensitive to the direction of cost harmonization and on the distribution of firm ownership between domestic and foreign. In the 9 Indeed, if one examined the derivative of W with respect to x, and take the limit as x →0 and d → 1, the conclusion would be that domestic welfare always benefits from FDI when c d > c f : While this is proved in the appendix, we present this formally as a lemma.
Lemma: There are at most one d on [0, (n-1)/n] that such that W(1) -W(0) = 0: Now that we have the conditions under which FDI reduces welfare when it is costincreasing and it is cost-reducing, we combine those conditions to arrive at the general conclusion for welfare-decreasing FDI. as the foreign firm switching to FDI reduces the average of the marginal costs but increases the dispersion, and still domestic welfare decreases. This contrasts sharply with Salant and Shaffer (1999) , who find that increased dispersion holding the average marginal cost constant always increases welfare.
Welfare effect of FDI by multiple foreign firms
In the preceding section we examined the welfare effect of FDI by a single firm. In this section we extend the analysis to the welfare effect of FDI by more than one foreign firm. Even if FDI by one foreign firm reduces domestic welfare, the intuition for this result, given in the introduction, may suggest that the benefits to either consumers or to domestic producers could dominate the harms to the other side when a sufficient number of foreign firms switch from exporting to FDI. To evaluate this supposition consider a welfare change at any arbitrary x ≥ 1.
. The right-hand side of (9) is linear in x with the positive coefficient,
However, W(x) -W(x − 1) can be negative for all x if the remainder of the RHS of (9) is sufficiently negative. Then, since This leads to the next proposition. The question then is whether having all foreign firms switch to FDI can change the initial harm to the domestic country. To see this, compute the domestic welfare when all foreign firms choose to export:
and domestic welfare when they all choose FDI
Taking the difference yields the change in domestic welfare form all the foreign firms switching to FDI
Suppose that d = 1/2 as in proposition 1, that is, when half of the producers are domestic producers. Then, the second bracketed term disappears and so (10) becomes
Then, by continuity, we conclude that, if the number of domestic producers is sufficiently close to one half, then foreign direct investment by all the foreign firms always lowers welfareregardless of whether FDI raises or lowers foreign firms' marginal costs. Thus, proposition 1 holds when all foreign firms engage in FDI. survives when all foreign firms switch to FDI. The proof follows similar steps as those leading to proposition 3. First, the right-hand side of (10) Thus, the condition in proposition 4 is weakened from 30% to 40%. This modification is
What perhaps is surprising however is that it is still bounded away from ½. Furthermore, for this weakened proposition to have relevance requires that the domestic country's policy will result in all foreign firms choosing FDI. That is, our results offer the following policy implications: the welfare maximizing domestic country should only allow FDI when it is both cost-reducing for foreign firms and the foreign producers are a large majority of all producers. Further, in this case, the government should let all foreign firms to switch to FDI, rather than a few. Otherwise, a restrictive policy towards FDI can be welfare superior.
Extensions
In this section we briefly consider how partial harmonization and product differentiation affect the results and how our model can be re-interpreted in terms of tax harmonization with the plant locations fixed.
We begin with the effect of partial harmonization. 
So, the result of propositions 1 and 6 also holds with partial harmonization. Note that W(ρ,n⋅(1 -
is decreasing in x: the larger the harmonization the greater the harm.
Proposition 9: Suppose that sufficiently close to half of all producers are domestic. Then when all foreign firms switch to FDI, domestic welfare decreases with any partial harmonization, whether FDI is cost-raising or cost-reducing.
Turning next to the effect of product differentiation, its implication can be seen intuitively by considering the duopoly case when the products are perfectly differentiated (that is, the domestic firm is a monopolist for its product and the foreign firm is a monopolist for its product). In such a case, the outcome is straightforward as there are only cost effects (that is, no strategic "business stealing" effects). Cost-increasing (cost-reducing) FDI decreases (increases)
welfare. Hence, the cost harmonization effect we have found here is stronger the less differentiated the products.
Finally, fix plant locations (i.e., FDI is no longer a choice) so that all foreign firms are locating abroad, and reinterpret our model in terms of tax harmonization. Specifically, assume that c d = c f =⎯c, but that in each country there is a per-unit tax t d and t f , so that domestic marginal costs are ĉ d =⎯c + t d and ĉ f =⎯c + t f . If tax-harmonization results in the foreign tax being brought closer inline with the domestic tax, then domestic welfare is reduced under the same conditions as before. That is, propositions 1-9 can be re-interpreted in terms of tax harmonization to the domestic tax rate.
Conclusion
We considered the cost implications of foreign firms relocating their plants into the countries where they sell their products (FDI). In particular, we note that this can have a cost harmonization effect -the costs of all producers are likely to become more closely aligned. If so, then we find a surprising implication: if the number of domestic and foreign firms are roughly equal, then welfare decrease regardless of whether the cost harmonization implies an increase or a decrease in aggregate marginal costs. This result not only highlights the importance of the cost harmonization effect, but has implications in any examination of FDI whenever there are cost differences among producers, for example, the effects of uncertainty and learning on the production location decision (e.g., Qiu and Zhou, 2006) . However, as we have demonstrated here, the welfare effects can be dampened or amplified by the cost harmonization effect.
Therefore, the studies that do not properly account for the cost harmonization effect may over-or understate the true welfare effect.
In terms of home government policy, there is an interesting implication when one relaxes the assumption that the home government is informed as to the firms' costs (see Creane and Miyagiwa 2008) . Even if the government does not know whether domestic costs of production are greater or less than foreign costs, it should not encourage (and perhaps should discourage)
FDI especially when domestic and foreign firms make up roughly half or more of the industry. 
